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The structure of many models in economics depends on majorization properties of convolutions of distributions.
In this paper, we analyze robustness of these properties and the models based on them to heavy-tailedness as-
sumptions. We show, in particular, that majorization properties of linear combinations of log-concavely distributed
signals are reversed for very long-tailed distributions. As applications of the results, we study robustness of mono-
tone consistency of the sample mean, value at risk analysis and the model of demand-driven innovation and spatial
competition as well as that of optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist in the case of an arbitrary
degree of complementarity or substitutability among the goods. The implications of the models remain valid for not
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is gratefully acknowledged.0. INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
0.1. Robustness of models and tail probabilities of linear combinations. In recent years, many papers
in economics and ﬁnance have focused on the analysis of the so-called ”thick-tailed” paradigm. It was documented
in numerous studies that the time series encountered in many ﬁelds in economics and ﬁnance appear to have heavy-
tailed distributions for which the variance and higher moments fail to exist (see Axtell (2001), the discussions in
Loretan and Phillips (1994), Duﬃe and Pan (1997) and Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou and Stanley (2003) and
references therein). Motivated by these empirical ﬁndings, a number of studies in ﬁnancial economics have focused
on portfolio and value-at-risk modelling with heavy-tailed returns (see, e.g., the reviews in Duﬃe and Pan (1997),
Uchaikin and Zolotarev (1999, Ch. 17) and Glasserman, Heidelberger and Shahabuddin (2002)). Several authors
considered problems of statistical inference for data from thick-tailed populations (see Loretan and Phillips (1994),
the papers in Adler, Feldman and Taqqu (1998) and references therein).
The results of many models in economics, ﬁnance, risk management and operations research, as well the analysis of
their robustness to distributional assumptions, depend on majorization and dominance properties of tail probabilities
and expectations of functions of random variables (r.v.’s) and their linear combinations. The concepts of stochastic
dominance are of central importance in the portfolio choice problems and the analysis of risk measures (see Levy
(1992) and Ruszczy´ nski and Vanderbei (2003)). Furthermore, the study of robustness of option pricing formulae to
assumptions on the distributions of the underlying assets’ prices can be reduced to the analysis of extremal properties
of linear functionals of probability measures with ﬁxed moments and problems of deriving sharp semiparametric
bounds on expectations of functions of random variables with prescribed distributional characteristics, such as
moments or probability density norms (see the discussion in de la Pe˜ na, Ibragimov and Jordan (2003) and references
therein). Moreover, the problems concerning the properties of cdf’s, moments and tail probabilities of r.v.’s and
their linear combinations also naturally appear in various microeconomic models. In monopoly theory, for instance,
the tail probability of a sum of functions of consumers’ valuations represents the probability that a monopolist will
choose to produce and sell the good (see, e.g., Cornelli (1996)). The analysis of optimal bundling strategies for
a multiproduct monopolist depends on stochastic comparisons between consumers’ reservation prices (valuations)
for goods provided by the seller and their bundles (see, among others, Adams and Yellen (1976), Palfrey (1983),
McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), Fang and Norman (2003) and Venkatesh
and Kamakura (2003)). According to Heckman and Honor´ e (1990), the majorization properties of (conditional)
moments and tail probabilities of r.v.’s are central to the analysis of robustness of the Roy model of self-selection
and earnings inequality to departures from the conditions of log-normality of skills. Similarly, a number of problems
in theories of ﬁrm growth involve the analysis of stochastic comparisons for r.v.’s and their sums as well as the study
of sharp bounds on their functionals (see Jovanovic and Rob (1987), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) and Sutton
(1997, Section IV)).
0.2. Majorization properties of log-concavely distributed r.v.’s. Powerful tools for analyzing the ordering
and extremal properties of expected values of functions of linear combinations of r.v.’s are given by majorization
theory. A vector a 2 R









i=1 b[i]; where a[1] ¸ ::: ¸ a[n] and b[1] ¸ ::: ¸ b[n] denote components of a and b
in decreasing order. The relation a Á b implies that the components of the vector a are more diverse than those of
1b (see Marshall and Olkin (1979)). In this context, it is easy to see that the following relations hold:
(1=(n + 1);:::;1=(n + 1);1=(n + 1)) Á (1=n;:::;1=n;0); n ¸ 1: (0.1)
A function Á : A ! R deﬁned on A µ Rn is called Schur-convex (resp., Schur-concave) on A if (a Á b) =)
(Á(a) · Á(b)) (resp. (a Á b) =) (Á(a) ¸ Á(b)) for all a;b 2 A: If, in addition, Á(a) < Á(b) (resp., Á(a) > Á(b))
whenever a Á b and a is not a permutation of b; then Á is said to be strictly Schur-convex (resp., strictly Schur-
concave) on A:
A r.v. X with density f : R ! R and the convex distribution support Ω = fx 2 R : f(x) > 0g is said to be
log-concavely distributed if for all x1;x2 2 Ω and any ¸ 2 [0;1]; f(¸x1 + (1 ¡ ¸)x2) ¸ (f(x1))¸(f(x2))1¡¸ (see An
(1998)).
Following Birnbaum (1948), we say that a r.v. X is more peaked about ¹ 2 R than is Y if P(jX ¡ ¹j > x) ·
P(jY ¡ ¹j > x) for all x ¸ 0: If the latter inequality is strict whenever the two probabilities are not both zero, the
r.v. X is said to be strictly more peaked about ¹ than is Y: In case ¹ = 0; X is simply said to be (strictly) more
peaked than Y: Roughly speaking, a r.v. X is more peaked about ¹ 2 R than is Y; if the distribution of X is more
concentrated about ¹ than is that of Y:
Throughout the paper, R+ stands for R+ = [0;1): Proschan (1965) obtains the following well-known result
concerning majorization and peakedness properties linear combinations of log-concavely distributed r.v.’s:
Proposition 0.1 (Proschan (1965)). If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. symmetric log-concavely distributed r.v.’s, then the
function Ã(a;x) = P
¡Pn
i=1 aiXi > x
¢
is strictly Schur-convex in a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x > 0 and is strictly
Schur-concave in a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x < 0:
Clearly, from Proposition 0.1 it follows that
Pn
i=1 aiXi is strictly more peaked than
Pn
i=1 biXi if a Á b and a is
not a permutation of b:
Proschan (1965) notes that Proposition 0.1 also holds for (two-fold) convolutions of log-concave distributions with
symmetric Cauchy distributions and shows that comparisons implied by the proposition are reversed for n = 2k;
vectors a = (1=n;1=n;:::;1=n) 2 Rn with identical components and certain transforms of symmetric Cauchy r.v.’s.
0.3. Implications for monotone consistency of the sample mean and portfolio value at risk. Propo-
sition 0.1 and its extensions have been applied to the analysis of a number of problems in economics, statistics and
other ﬁelds. For instance, Eaton (1988) used generalizations of the results to obtain concentration inequalities for
Gauss-Markov estimators. Several authors (see, e.g., Proschan (1965), Tong (1994) and Jensen (1997)) discussed
implications of Proposition 0.1 and its extensions in the study of monotone consistency of estimators in econometrics
and statistics . A weakly consistent estimator ˆ µn of a population parameter µ is said to exhibit monotone consistency
for µ if ˆ µn becomes successively more peaked about µ as n increases, that is, if P(jˆ µn+1 ¡ µj > x) · P(jˆ µn ¡ µj > x)
for all x ¸ 0: By majorization comparisons (0.1), from Proposition 0.1 it follows that samples X1;:::;Xn; n ¸ 1;
from a log-concavely distributed population symmetric about ¹ 2 R; have the monotone peakedness of the sample
mean (MPSM) property, that is, the sample mean Xn = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 Xi becomes increasingly more peaked about
2¹ as n gets larger. Thus, Xn exhibits monotone consistency for ¹: This implies that an increase in the sample size
always improves performance of the sample mean.
Proposition 0.1 also has the following important interpretation in the framework of value-at-risk (VaR) analysis
and portfolio choice theory. In what follows, given a loss probability ® 2 (0;1=2) and a r.v. (risk) Z; we denote by
V aR®(Z) the value at risk (VaR) of Z at level ®; that is, its (1¡®)¡quantile3. Let Zw =
Pn
i=1 wiXi be the return on
a portfolio of risks X1;:::;Xn with weights w = (w1;:::;wn) 2 Rn
+;
Pn
i=1 wi = 1: Further, let w = (1=n;1=n;:::;1=n)
and w = (1;0;:::;0): The expressions V aR®(Zw) and V aR®(Zw) are, thus, the values at risk of the portfolio with
equal weights and of the portfolio consisting of only one return (risk). According to Proposition 0.1, ”diversiﬁcation”
of a portfolio of i.i.d. symmetric log-concave risks X1;:::;Xn (formalized by majorization properties of the vector
of portfolio weights w) decreases riskiness of its return Zw in the sense of (ﬁrst-order) stochastic dominance. This
implies that, for all ® 2 (0;1=2); V aR®(Zv) · V aR®(Zw) if v Á w: Furthermore, by relations (0.1), the value at
risk is minimal for the portfolio weights w and is maximal for the weights w :
V aR®(Zw) · V aR®(Zw) · V aR®(Zw): (0.2)
The latter comparisons imply, in turn, that, in the case of i.i.d. log-concavely distributed risks X1 and X2; the VaR
has the following subadditivity property:
V aR®(X1 + X2) · V aR®(X1) + V aR®(X2) (0.3)
for all ® 2 (0;1=2): Thus, the value at risk is a coherent risk measure in the sense of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and
Heath (1999) in the world of log-concave distributions (see also Embrechts, McNeil and Straumann (1999) and
Section 3 in the present paper).
0.4. Implications for ﬁrm growth and Gibrat’s law. A voluminous empirical literature on ﬁrm growth
has focused on testing the validity of Gibrat’s law according to which ﬁrm growth rates are independent of their
sizes and are non-autocorrelated over time. Many papers in the ﬁeld have observed deviations from Gibrat’s law in
data, including the patterns of positive or negative dependence between ﬁrm growth and size and autocorrelation
in ﬁrm growth rates (see, e.g., the reviews in McCloughan (1995) and Sutton (1997)). Motivated, in part, by these
empirical ﬁndings, several studies have proposed models that could account for such phenomena. E.g., Jovanovic
(1982) developed a Bayesian learning model of ﬁrm growth in which ﬁrms uncover their relative eﬃciency with time.
The general learning model predicts negative dependence between age and ﬁrm growth and suggests, therefore, that
a similar pattern in correlation between the growth rates and ﬁrm size holds. Jovanovic and Rob (1987) proposed a
model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition based on the idea that larger ﬁrms get better information
about the design of future products. The model implies departures from Gibrat’s law in heterogenous markets, with
ﬁrms’ size being autocorrelated over time. Jovanovic and Rob’ model assumes that each period, the ﬁrm observes a
sample S of signals si = µ + ²i; i = 1;:::;N; about the next period’s ideal product µ 2 R; where ²i; i = 1;:::;N; are
i.i.d. unimodal shocks with mode 0 and N is a (random) sample size. The ﬁrm then chooses a product design ˆ µ 2 R; a
level of output y and an amount of investment in information z ¸ 0; with C(y) and K(z) denoting the corresponding
convex and twice diﬀerentiable cost functions. Using Proposition 0.1, Jovanovic and Rob (1987) showed that, in
3That is, in the case of an absolutely continuous risk Z; P(Z > V aR®(Z)) = ®:
3the case of symmetric and log-concavely distributed signal shocks ²1;²2;:::; the model has the following properties:
If the optimal levels (y;z) of the ﬁrm’s output and informational gathering eﬀort satisfy the ﬁrst- and second-order
conditions for a maximum, then
² The probability of rank reversals in adjacent periods (that is, the probability of the smaller of two ﬁrms
becoming the larger one next period) is always less than one half;
² This probability diminishes as the current size-diﬀerence increases;
² The distribution of future size is stochastically increasing as a function of current size.
0.5. Majorization comparisons and optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist. Ap-
plying analytical and numerical techniques to derive stochastic comparisons related to those implied by Proposition
0.1 for prescribed distributions for reservation prices in the case of two products and their packages (such as bivari-
ate uniform or Gaussian distributions), many of studies in the bundling literature emphasized that a monopoly’s
bundling decisions depend on correlations between consumers’ valuations for the products (see Adams and Yellen
(1976), McAfee et. al. (1989), Schmalensee (1984) and Salinger (1995)), the degrees of complementarity and substi-
tutability between the goods (e.g., Lewbel (1985) and Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)) and the marginal costs for
the products (see, among others, Salinger (1995) and Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)). Palfrey (1983) obtained
results that give conditions under which consumers prefer (ex ante) a single bundled Vickrey auction to separate
provision of independently priced goods4 under the MPSM property discussed in Subsection 0.3 (see Theorem 8 in
Palfrey (1983)). Palfrey (1983) showed that, in the case of two bidders, the seller maximizes her proﬁt by selling
the goods in a single bundle; the two buyers, however, unanimously prefer separate provision of objects to any other
bundling decision. Palfrey’s (1983) results also imply that, if stand-alone valuations are concentrated on a ﬁnite
interval, then consumers never unanimously prefer separate provision of items to a single Vickrey auction, ex ante,
if there are more than two buyers (Theorems 5-7 in Palfrey (1983)). Chakraborty (1999) obtained characterizations
of optimal bundling strategies for a monopolist providing two goods on Vickrey auctions under a regularity condi-
tion on quantiles of reservation prices which is implied, in the case of symmetry, by subadditivity property (0.3).
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) investigated the optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist providing
bundles of independently priced goods with zero marginal costs (information goods) for proﬁt-maximizing prices to
consumers with valuations that have the MPSM property5. Among other results, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)
showed that, in the latter setting, if the seller prefers bundling a certain number of goods to selling them separately
and if the optimal price per good for the bundle is less than the mean valuation, then bundling any greater number
of goods will further increase the seller’s proﬁts, compared to the case when the additional goods are sold sepa-
rately. According to the result, if consumers’ valuations have the MPSM property, then a form of superadditivity for
bundling decisions holds: the beneﬁts to the seller grow as the number of goods in the bundle increases6. Recently,
4The goods provided by the monopolist are said to be independently priced if consumers’ valuations for their bundles are additive in
those for the component goods, as opposed to the case of interrelated goods, e.g., substitutes or complements (see Dansby and Conrad
(1984), Lewbel (1985), Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) and Section 5 in the present paper).
5As discussed above, by Proposition 0.1, this condition is satisﬁed for log-concavely distributed valuations symmetric about the mean
reservation price. In particular, the condition holds for valuations with a ﬁnite support [v;v] distributed as the truncation XI(jX¡¹j < h)
of an arbitrary r.v. X with a log-concave density symmetric about (v + v)=2; where I(¢) is the indicator function (see also Remark 2 in
An (1998)).
6This property is similar to the case of Vickrey auctions with two buyers (see Remark 2 in Palfrey (1983)).
4applying Proposition 0.1, Fang and Norman (2003) showed that a multiproduct monopolist providing bundles of
independently priced goods to consumers with log-concavely distributed valuations prefers selling them separately
to any other bundling decision of the marginal costs of all the products are greater than the mean valuation; under
some additional distributional assumptions, the seller prefers providing the goods as a single bundle to any other
bundling decision if the marginal costs of the goods are identical and are less than the mean reservation price. The
main intuition behind the analysis of optimal bundling decisions (see the discussion in Palfrey (1983), Schmalensee
(1984), Salinger (1995), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Fang and Norman (2003)) is that, for light-tailed distri-
butions, consumers’ valuations per good for a bundle typically have a lower variance relative to the valuations for
individual goods7.
0.6. Extensions of Proposition 0.1 and its implications. A number of papers in probability and statistics
have focused on extension of Proschan’s results (see, e.g., Chan, Park and Proschan (1989), the review in Tong
(1994), Jensen (1997) and Ma (1998)). These studies allow one to readily obtain extensions of the results discussed
in Subsections 0.3-0.5 to more general classes of distributions8. One should emphasize, however, that in all the
studies that dealt with generalizations of Proposition 0.1, the majorization properties of the tail probabilities were
of the same type as in Proschan (1965). Namely, the results gave extensions of Proschan’s results concerning
Schur¡convexity of the tail probabilities Ã(a;x); x > 0; to classes of r.v.’s more general than those considered
in Proschan (1965). We are not aware of any general results concerning Schur¡concavity of the tail probabilities
Ã(a;x); x > 0; for certain classes of r.v.’s9.
One should also note here that departures from conditions of log-concavity of distributions are necessary in the
study of robustness of models involving them to heavy-tailedness assumptions since all moments of a log-concave
density are ﬁnite and thus any such density is very light-tailed (see An (1998)).
0.7. Main majorization results of the paper and their implications for monotone consistency and
portfolio VaR. In this paper, we present results on robustness of majorization properties of tail probabilities of
linear combinations of r.v.’s and models in economics and risk management based on them to thick-tailedness as-
sumptions. In particular, we show that majorization properties of convex combinations of r.v.’s given by Proposition
0.1 continue to hold for not too heavy distributions, as modelled by convolutions of stable distributions with (diﬀer-
ent) characteristic exponents greater than the threshold value of one and log-concave distributions (Theorem 2.3).
However, the properties are reversed for r.v.’s with very thick-tailed distributions, as modelled by convolutions of
stable distributions with indices of stability less than one (Theorem 2.4). As discussed in the previous subsection,
to our knowledge, the latter results are the ﬁrst ones that show that the general majorization properties given by
Proposition 0.1 are reversed for certain classes of distributions. Moreover, we obtain results that give analogues of
Proposition 0.1 for heavy-tailed r.v.’s and majorization comparisons between powers of coeﬃcients of their linear
7Further intuition behind the power of bundling is that, for light-tailed distributions, it reduces uncertainty about consumers’ valua-
tions and leads to a decrease in extreme values of the distribution of valuations per good, thereby reducing buyer diversity and increasing
the predictive power of the selling strategy (see Schmalensee (1984) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)).
8For instance, from Chan, Park and Proschan (1989) it follows that the results in Subsection 0.3-0.5 continue to hold for (dependent)
r.v.’s (representing risks, consumers’ signals or valuations) that have a sign-invariant and Schur-concave joint density. From Ma (1998)
it follows that under certain additional assumptions, the results hold for non-identical log-concave distributions.
9One should note that the proof in Proschan (1965) can be reproduced word to word with respective changes of signs under the
”assumptions” that X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. symmetric log-convexily distributed r.v.’s. However, as it is easy to see, the later objects do
not exist, namely, there does not exist a symmetric r.v.’s with a log-convex density (see also An (1998)). Therefore, this approach to
obtaining counterparts of Proposition 0.1 for Schur-concavity of Ã(a;x); x > 0; is hopeless.
5combinations (Theorems 2.1 and 2.2). From our results it follows, in particular, that the implications of the propo-
sition for monotone consistency of the sample mean and the portfolio value at risk discussed in Subsections 0.5 and
0.6 continue to hold for not too thick-tailed distributions (Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2). In addition, it is demonstrated
that the VaR is a coherent measure of risk in the case of not very-heavy tailed returns (see the discussion in Section
3). The results on the portfolio VaR are reversed, however, for very long-tailed distributions of the risks (Corollary
3.3). From our results it follows that a diversiﬁcation of a portfolio of very heavy tailed risks, as modelled by
convolutions of stable distributions with characteristic exponents less than one, leads to an increase in the riskiness
of the portfolio. More speciﬁcally, the signs of inequalities in (0.2) and (0.3) are reversed for very long-tailed risks.
For instance, our results reveal that (see Corollary 3.3), in a world of very heavy-tailed risks, the value at risk always
has a strict superadditivity property instead of subadditivity in (0.3) and thus is not a coherent risk measure in the
sense of Artzner et. al. (1999). Using the general results on majorization properties of the tail probabilities of linear
combinations of r.v.’s derived in the paper, we also obtain sharp bounds on the VaR of portfolios of heavy-tailed
risks that give reﬁnements of estimates (0.2) and their analogues in the very thick-tailed case (Corollaries 3.4 and
3.5).
0.8. Robustness of the model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition to heavy-
tailedness assumptions. In a similar context, using the general probability results obtained in the paper, we focus
on the analysis of robustness of the properties of Jovanovic and Rob’s (1987) model of demand-driven innovation and
spatial competition to the assumptions of heavy-tailedness of signals’ distributions. In particular, we show that the
properties of the model for log-concavely distributed signals (see Subsection 0.4) remain valid for the class of not too
heavy-tailed distributions, as modelled by convolutions of stable distributions with the characteristic exponents in
the interval (1;2) and log-concave distributions (Theorem 4.1). However, we prove that the above properties of the
model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition are reversed under the assumption that the distributions
of the signals are very long-tailed (Theorem 4.2).
We prove inter alia that the following results hold: Suppose that in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), the signal shocks
²1;²2;::: are i.i.d. r.v.’s with a distribution which is a convolution of symmetric stable distributions with indices
of stability in the interval (0;1): If the optimal levels (y;z) of the ﬁrm’s output and informational gathering eﬀort
satisfy the ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for a maximum, then
² The probability of rank reversals in adjacent periods (that is, the probability of the smaller of the two ﬁrms
becoming the larger one next period) is always greater than one half;
² This probability increases as the current size-diﬀerence increases;
² The distribution of future size is stochastically decreasing as a function of current size.
Furthermore, we show that if the cost K(z) of engaging in the informational gathering eﬀort is increasing in z ¸ 0;
and the shocks ²1;²2;::: are i.i.d. r.v.’s with a distribution which is a convolution of symmetric stable distributions
with characteristic exponents in the interval (0;1); then the optimal choice of investment z is zero: z = 0 (Theorem
4.3). The latter result is quite intuitive and implies that, if the cost to the ﬁrms of gathering information is
increasing in z and the sample of signals consists of very long-tailed r.v.’s and is, therefore, uninformative about
6the next period’s ideal product µ; then all ﬁrms choose not to invest in information gathering. Furthermore, in
contrast to the model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition with log-concavely distributed or not
too heavy-tailed signals, in the model with arbitrary convex cost functions C(y) and K(z) and very fat-tailed shocks
²1;²2;:::; it turns out that large ﬁrms are not likely to stay larger. In addition to that, under the assumptions of very
heavy-tailed signals, there is negative autocorrelation in the size-diﬀerence. Essentially, in the case of very heavy-
tailed signals, smaller ﬁrms, in fact, have an advantage over their larger counterparts. The underlying intuition is
that in the presence of very heavy-tailed shocks, the sample of signals is not informative about the ideal product
since it is likely to contain extreme outliers. Hence, it is sheer luck in choosing the product design ˆ µ close to µ; and
not the informational advantage that matters. Smaller ﬁrms which get less useless information and spend less in its
gathering and processing are more likely to be more successful. It is important to note that from these results it
follows that, in the model with very heavy-tailed signals, the ﬁrm growth is likely to decrease with ﬁrm size. Similar
to the discussion in Subsection 0.4, the above implies that Gibrat’s law does not hold in the setup. Moreover, in the
case of very-heavy tailed signals, both the implications of Gibrat’s law fail. First, ﬁrm growth and size appear to
be dependent; second, the implication of Gibrat’s law that ﬁrm growth rates are non-autocorrelated over time does
not hold either.
0.9. Optimal bundling decisions for a multiproduct monopolist in the case of long-tailed reserva-
tion prices and interrelated goods. We develop a framework that allows one to model the optimal bundling
problem of a multiproduct monopolist providing interrelated goods with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or
substitutability. Using the general majorization results obtained in the paper, we derive characterizations of optimal
bundling strategies for the seller in this setup in the case of long-tailed valuations and tastes for the products. Among
other results, we show that if the goods provided on a Vickrey auction are independently priced or are substitutes (or
complements with not very high degree of complementarity) and bidders’ tastes for the objects are not very heavy
tailed, then the risk-neutral monopolist strictly prefers separate provision of the products to any other bundling
decision (Theorem 5.1). The results are reversed, however, in the case of a risk-averse auctioneer providing indepen-
dently priced goods or complements (or substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability) to consumers with
very long-tailed tastes for the products (Theorem 5.2)10. According to our analysis, in the latter case, regardless of
the number of consumers, the seller always strictly prefers providing the goods on a single Vickrey auction to any
other bundling decision, as in the setting with two buyers in Palfrey (1983). This conclusion provides, in particular,
a reversal of the results in Chakraborty (1999) from which it follows that, in the case of symmetric valuations satis-
fying comparisons (0.3), provision of independently priced goods through separate Vickrey auctions generates larger
expected proﬁts to the seller than any other bundling decision if the number of buyers is suﬃciently large. We also
obtain a characterization of consumers’ preferences over the monopolist’s bundling decision in a Vickrey auction in
the case of heavy-tailed valuations for the products. We show, for instance, that if bidders’ reservation prices for
independently priced goods are very heavy-tailed, as modelled by positive stable distributions (see Section 1), then
they unanimously prefer separate Vickrey auctions to any other bundling decision (Theorem 5.3). These results are
at odds with a setting where valuations have a ﬁnite distributional support in which, according to Palfrey (1983),
consumers never unanimously prefer separate provision of the products, as discussed in Subsection 0.5.
10The assumption of seller’s risk aversion is necessary in the case of very heavy-tailed tastes and valuations since otherwise the
monopolist’s expected proﬁt is inﬁnite for any bundling decision.
7Using the main probabilistic results derived in this paper, we also obtain characterizations of optimal bundling
strategies for a monopolist who provides goods with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability to
consumers with heavy-tailed tastes for proﬁt-maximizing prices (Theorems 5.4-5.7). We show, in particular, that,
for products with high marginal costs, the seller’s optimal strategy is to provide complements with very heavy-
tailed consumers’ tastes for them separately and those with suﬃciently light-tailed valuations as a single bundle.
For relatively low marginal costs, these conclusions are reversed (Theorems 5.4 and 5.5). Contrary to the case
where goods with very light-tailed valuations are considered, as in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and Fang and
Norman (2003), if consumers’ tastes for the products are very long-tailed, then the monopolist’s optimal strategy is
to provide independently priced goods or complements (or substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability)
with relatively high marginal costs as a single bundle and those with suﬃciently low marginal costs separately
(Theorem 5.7). Our results imply, for instance, that for positive stable distributions of tastes, irrespective of the
marginal costs of producing the goods in question, the optimal strategy is to provide the goods as a single bundle
if the goods are independently priced or are complements (or if the goods are substitutes with not very high degree
of substitutability).
The underlying intuition that drives our results on bundling is closely related to that based on the behavior
of variance in the world of light-tailed valuations (see Subsection 0.5). Namely, our majorization results imply,
essentially, that, in the case of not very heavy-tailed reservation prices, the consumers’ valuations for bundles of
goods always have less spread relative to the valuations for component goods, as measured by peakedness. On the
other hand, in the case of very heavy-tailed valuations, the spread of reservation prices for bundles is always greater
than that of valuations for components (see Section 5 for more on the intuition).
0.10. Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 contains notations and
deﬁnitions of classes of distributions used throughout the paper. In Section 2, we derive the main results of the
paper on majorization properties of linear combinations of long-tailed r.v.’s. Section 3 presents implications of the
majorization results in Section 2 in the study of monotone consistency of the sample mean and portfolio value at
risk and in the analysis of coherency of the VaR. In Section 4, we obtain the applications of the general majorization
results in analysis of the robustness of the model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition described in
Subsection 0.4 to the assumptions of heavy-tailedness of signals’ distributions. In Section 5 the general majorization
results are applied to the study of the optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist in the case of
heavy-tailed tastes for and an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability among the goods produced.
Finally, Section 6 contains the proofs of the results obtained in the paper.
1. NOTATIONS
For 0 < ® · 2; ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ¹ 2 R; we denote by S®(¾;¯;¹) the stable distribution with the
characteristic exponent (index of stability) ®; the scale parameter ¾; the symmetry index (skewness parameter) ¯
and the location parameter ¹: That is, S®(¾;¯;¹) is the distribution of a r.v. X with the characteristic function
E(eixX) =
(
expfi¹x ¡ ¾®jxj®(1 ¡ i¯sign(x)tan(¼®=2))g; ® 6= 1;
expfi¹x ¡ ¾jxj(1 + (2=¼)i¯sign(x)lnjxjg; ® = 1;
x 2 R; where i2 = ¡1 and sign(x) is the sign of x deﬁned by sign(x) = 1 if x > 0; sign(0) = 0 and sign(x) = ¡1
8otherwise. In what follows, we write X » S®(¾;¯;¹); if the r.v. X has the stable distribution S®(¾;¯;¹):
A closed form expression for the density f(x) of the distribution S®(¾;¯;¹) is available in the following cases
(and only in those cases): ® = 2 (Gaussian distributions); ® = 1 and ¯ = 0 (Cauchy distributions)11; ® = 1=2 and
¯ § 1 (L´ evy distributions)12. Degenerate distributions correspond to the limiting case ® = 0:
The index of stability ® characterizes the heaviness (the rate of decay) of the tails of stable distributions
S®(¾;¯;¹): In particular, the p¡th absolute moments EjXjp of a r.v. X » S®(¾;¯;¹); ® 2 (0;2) are ﬁnite if
p < ® and are inﬁnite otherwise. The symmetry index ¯ characterizes the skewness of the distribution. The stable
distributions with ¯ = 0 are symmetric about the location parameter ¹: The stable distributions with ¯ = §1 and
® 2 (0;1) (and only they) are one-sided, the support of these distributions is the semi-axis [¹;1) for ¯ = 1 and is
(¡1;¹] (in particular, the L´ evy distribution with ¹ = 0 is concentrated on the positive semi-axis for ¯ = 1 and
on the negative semi-axis for ¯ = ¡1). In the case ® > 1 the location parameter ¹ is the mean of the distribution
S®(¾;¯;¹): The scale parameter ¾ is a generalization of the concept of standard deviation; it coincides with the
latter in the special case of Gaussian distributions (® = 2). For a detailed review of properties of stable distributions
the reader is referred to, e.g., the monographs by Zolotarev (1986) and Uchaikin and Zolotarev (1999).
Throughout the paper, LC denotes the class of symmetric log-concave distributions13, as deﬁned in Subsection
0.2 in the introduction.
For 0 < r < 2; we denote by CS(r) the class of distributions which are convolutions of symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with characteristic exponents14 ® 2 (r;2] and ¾ > 0. That is, CS(r) consists of distributions
of r.v.’s X such that, for some k ¸ 1; X = Y1 + ::: + Yk; where Yi; i = 1;:::;k; are independent r.v.’s such that
Yi » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (r;2]; ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;k:
Further, CSLC stands for the class of convolutions of distributions from the classes LC and CS(1): That is, CSLC
is the class of convolutions of symmetric distributions which are either log-concave or stable with characteristic
exponents greater than one15. In other words, CSLC consists of distributions of r.v.’s X such that X = Y1 + Y2;
where Y1 and Y2 are independent r.v.’s with distributions belonging to LC or CS(1):
Finally, for 0 < r · 2; we denote by CS(r) the class of distributions which are convolutions of symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with indices of stability16 ® 2 (0;r) and ¾ > 0: That is, CS(r) consists of distributions
of r.v.’s X such that, for some k ¸ 1; X = Y1 + ::: + Yk; where Yi; i = 1;:::;k; are independent r.v.’s such that
Yi » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (0;r); ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;k:
A linear combination of independent stable r.v.’s with the same characteristic exponent ® also has a stable
distribution with the same ®: However, in general, this does not hold true in the case of convolutions of stable
distributions with diﬀerent indices of stability. Therefore, the class CS(r) of convolutions of symmetric stable
11The densities of Cauchy distributions are f(x) = ¾=(¼(¾2 + (x ¡ ¹)2)):
12L´ evy distributions have densities f(x) = (¾=(2¼))1=2exp(¡¾=(2x))x¡3=2; x ¸ 0; f(x) = 0; x < 0; where ¾ > 0; and their shifted
versions.
13LC stands for ”log-concave”.
14Here and below, CS stands for ”convolutions of stable”; the overline indicates that convolutions of stable distributions with indices
of stability greater than the threshold value r are taken.
15CSLC is the abbreviation of ”convolutions of stable and log-concave”.
16The underline indicates considering stable distributions with indices of stability less than the threshold value r:
9distributions with diﬀerent indices of stability ® 2 (r;2] is wider than the class of all symmetric stable distributions
S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (r;2] and ¾ > 0: Similarly, the class CS(r) is wider than the class of all symmetric stable
distributions S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (0;r) and ¾ > 0:
Clearly, CS(1) ½ CSLC and LC ½ CSLC: It should also be noted that the class CSLC is wider than the class of
(two-fold) convolutions of log-concave distributions with stable distributions S®(¾;0;0) with ® 2 (1;2] and ¾ > 0:
By deﬁnition, for 0 < r1 < r2 · 2; the following inclusions hold: CS(r2) ½ CS(r1) and CS(r1) ½ CS(r2):
In some sense, symmetric (about ¹ = 0) Cauchy distributions S1(¾;0;0) are at the dividing boundary between
the classes CS(1) and CS(1) (and between the classes CS(1) and CSLC). Similarly, for r 2 (0;2); symmetric stable
distributions Sr(¾;0;0) with the characteristic exponent ® = r are at the dividing boundary between the classes
CS(r) and CS(r): Further, symmetric normal distributions S2(¾;0;0) are at the dividing boundary between the class
LC of log-concave distributions and the class CS(2) of convolutions of symmetric stable distributions with indices of
stability17 ® < 2:
In what follows, we write X » LC (resp., X » CSLC; X » CS(r) or X » CS(r)) if the distribution of the r.v. X
belongs to the class LC (resp., CSLC; CS(r) or CS(r)).
2. MAJORIZATION PROPERTIES OF HEAVY-TAILED DISTRIBUTIONS
Theorems 2.1-2.4 in this section give analogues of Proposition 0.1 in Subsection 0.2 in the introduction for
heavy-tailed r.v.’s. In particular, according to the following Theorem 2.1, the majorization properties of convex
combinations of r.v.’s in the classes CS(r) are of the same type as in Proposition 0.1 with respect to the comparisons
between the powers of the components of the vectors of weights of the combinations.
Theorem 2.1 Let r 2 (0;2): If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0;
¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (r;2]; or Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x); a 2 Rn
+ in Proposition 0.1 is strictly
Schur-convex in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) for x > 0 and is strictly Schur-concave in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) for x < 0:
As follows from Theorem 2.2 below, the majorization properties of the tail probabilities Ã(a;x) in Theorem 2.1
are reversed in the case of r.v.’s from the classes CS(r):
Theorem 2.2 Let r 2 (0;2]: If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0;
¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); or Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x); a 2 Rn
+ in Proposition 0.1 is strictly
Schur-concave in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) for x > 0 and is strictly Schur-convex in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) for x < 0:
According to Theorem 2.3 below, peakedness properties of linear combinations of r.v.’s with not too heavy-tailed
distributions, as modelled, e.g., by convolutions of log-concave distributions and symmetric stable distributions with
characteristic exponents greater than one, are the same as in the case of log-concave distributions in Proschan (1965).
17More precisely, the symmetric Cauchy distributions are the only ones that belong to all the classes CS(r) with r > 1 and all the
classes CS(r) with r < 1: Symmetric stable distributions Sr(¾;0;0) are the only ones that belong to all the classes CS(r0) with r0 > r
and all the classes CS(r0) with r0 < r: Symmetric normal distributions are the only distributions belonging to the class LC and all the
classes CS(r) with r 2 (0;2):
10Theorem 2.3 Proposition 0.1 holds if X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some
¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or Xi » CSLC; i = 1;:::;n:
As follows from Theorem 2.4, peakedness properties given by Proposition 0.1 and Theorem 2.3 above are reversed
in the case of r.v.’s with very heavy-tailed distributions, as modelled by convolutions of stable distributions with
indices of stability less than one.
Theorem 2.4 If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
and ® 2 (0;1); or Xi » CS(1); i = 1;:::;n; then the function Ã(a;x) in Proposition 0.1 is strictly Schur-concave in
(a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x > 0 and is strictly Schur-convex in (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ for x < 0:
Remark 2.1. If r.v.’s X1;:::;Xn have a symmetric Cauchy distribution S1(¾;0;0) which is, as discussed in Section
1, exactly at the dividing boundary between the class CS(1) in Theorem 2.4 and the class CSLC in Theorem 2.3, then
the function Ã(a;x) in the theorems depends only on
Pn
i=1 ai and x and so is both Schur-concave and Schur-convex
in a 2 Rn
+ for all x 2 R (see Proschan (1965)). Similarly, the function Ã(a;x); a 2 Rn




i and x and so is both Schur-concave and Schur-convex in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) for all x 2 R if the r.v.’s
X1;:::;Xn in the theorems have a symmetric stable distribution Sr(¾;0;0) with the index of stability ® = r which
is at the dividing boundary between the classes CS(r) and CS(r): As follows from the proof of Theorems 2.1-2.4,
the above implies that Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 continue to hold for convolutions of distributions from the classes
CSLC and CS(1) with symmetric Cauchy distributions S1(¾;0;0): Similarly, Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 continue to hold
for convolutions of distributions from the classes CS(r) and CS(r) with symmetric stable distributions Sr(¾;0;0):
The latter generalizations imply corresponding extensions in the applications of majorization properties of linear
combinations of heavy-tailed r.v.’s throughout the rest of the paper.
3. MONOTONE CONSISTENCY, PORTFOLIO VALUE AT
RISK AND COHERENCY OF THE VaR
Theorem 2.3 provides the following result concerning the monotone consistency properties of the sample mean
for data from heavy-tailed population.
Corollary 3.1 Let ¹ 2 R: If X1;:::;Xn; n ¸ 1; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i = 1;:::;n; for some
¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or Xi ¡¹ » CSLC; then the sample mean Xn = (1=n)
Pn
i=1 Xi exhibits monotone
consistency for ¹; that is, P(jXn ¡ ¹j > x) converges to zero monotonically in n for all x ¸ 0:
In addition to Corollary 3.1, from the majorization results given by Theorem 2.3 it follows, similar to the case
of log-concave distributions in Subsection 0.3 in the introduction, that diversiﬁcation of a portfolio of not too thick-
tailed risks Xi » CSLC; i = 1;:::;n; with weights w = (w1;:::;wn) 2 Rn
+;
Pn
i=1 wi = 1; leads to a decrease in the
riskiness of its return Zw =
Pn
i=1 wiXi in the sense of (ﬁrst-order) stochastic dominance. Let, as in Subsection 0.3
in the introduction, for ® 2 (0;1=2); V aR®(Zw) be the value at risk of Zw associated with the loss probability ®:
We obtain the following result.
11Corollary 3.2 Let Xi; i = 1;:::;n; be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » CSLC; i = 1;:::;n: Then V aR®(Zv) < V aR®(Zw)
if v Á w and v is not a permutation of w: In particular, V aR®(Zw) < V aR®(Zw) < V aR®(Zw) for all ® 2
(0;1=2) and all weights w such that w 6= w and w is not a permutation of w: For all ® 2 (0;1=2); one also has
V aR®(X1 + X2) < V aR®(X1) + V aR®(X2):
In contrast, the results in Theorem 2.4 imply that the results for the VaR of portfolios discussed in Subsection
0.3 in the introduction are reversed under the assumption that the distributions of the risks X1;:::;Xn are very
long-tailed, as modelled by convolutions of stable distributions with indices of stability less than 1. In the latter
setup, diversiﬁcation of a portfolio of the risks increases riskiness of its return. We have the following
Corollary 3.3 Let Xi; i = 1;:::;n; be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » CS(1); i = 1;:::;n: Then V aR®(Zv) > V aR®(Zw)
if v Á w and v is not a permutation of w: In particular, V aR®(Zw) < V aR®(Zw) < V aR®(Zw) for all ® 2
(0;1=2) and all weights w such that w 6= w and w is not a permutation of w: For all ® 2 (0;1=2); one also has
V aR®(X1) + V aR®(X2) < V aR®(X1 + X2):
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 imply the following results that give sharp bounds on the value at risk of portfolios of
heavy-tailed returns (risks). These bounds reﬁne and complement the estimates given by Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 in
the worlds of not too heavy-tailed and very heavy-tailed risks.











for all ® 2 (0;1=2) and all weights w such that w 6= w and w is not a permutation of w:
Corollary 3.5 Let r 2 (0;2]; ® 2 (0;1=2) and let X1;:::;Xn be i.i.d. risks such that Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n: Then










for all ® 2 (0;1=2) and all weights w such that w 6= w and w is not a permutation of w:
Let X be a certain linear space of r.v.’s X deﬁned on a probability space (Ω;=;P): We assume that X contains
all degenerate r.v.’s X ´ a 2 R: According to the deﬁnition in Artzner et. al. (1999) (see also Embrechts et. al.
(1999) and Fritelli and Gianin (2002)), a functional R : X ! R is said to be a coherent measure of risk if it satisﬁes
the following axioms:
A1. (Monotonicity) R(X) ¸ R(Y ) for all X;Y 2 X such that Y · X (a.s.), that is, P(X · Y ) = 1.
A2. (Translation invariance) R(X + a) = R(X) + a for all X 2 X and any a 2 R:
A3. (Positive homogeneity) R(¸X) = ¸R(X) for all X 2 X and any ¸ ¸ 0:
12A4. (Subadditivity) R(X + Y ) · R(X) + R(Y ) for all X;Y 2 X:
In some papers (see, e.g., Fritelli and Gianin (2002) and F¨ olmer and Schied (2002)), the axioms A3 and A4 were
replaced by the following weaker axiom of convexity:
A5. (Convexity) R(¸X + (1 ¡ ¸)Y ) · ¸R(X) + (1 ¡ ¸)R(Y ) for all X;Y 2 X and any ¸ 2 [0;1]
(clearly, A5 follows from A3 and A4). The above axioms are natural conditions to be imposed on measures of risk in
the setting where positive values of r.v.’s X 2 X represent losses18 of a risk holder, in particular, from the regulatory
point of view as well as from liquidity considerations (see the discussion in Artzner et. al. (1999)). In addition
to that, the properties A1-A5 are important because, as follows from Huber (1981, Ch. 10) (see also Artzner et.
al. (1999)), in the case of a ﬁnite Ω; a risk measure R is coherent (that is, it satisﬁes A1-A4) if and only if it is
representable as R(X) = supQ2P EQ(X); where P is some set of probability measures on Ω and, for Q 2 P; EQ
denotes the expectation with respect to Q: In other words, the risk measure R is the worst result of computing the
expected loss EQ(X) over a set P of ”generalized scenarios” (probability measures) Q. A similar representation
holds as well in the case of an arbitrary Ω and the space X = L1(Ω;=;P) of bounded r.v.’s (see F¨ olmer and Schied
(2002)); moreover, as discussed in Fritelli and Gianin (2002), by duality theory, the convexity axiom A5 alone implies
analogues of such characterizations for an arbitrary Ω and the space X = Lp(Ω;=;P); p ¸ 1; of r.v.’s X with a ﬁnite
p¡th moment EjXjp < 1:
It is easy to verify that the value at risk V aR®(X) satisﬁes the axioms of monotonicity, positive homogeneity
and translation invariance A1, A3 and A4. However, as follows from the counterexamples constructed by Artzner
et. al. (1999) and Embrechts et. al. (1999), in general, it fails to satisfy the subadditivity and convexity properties
A2 and A5, in particular, for certain Pareto distributions (Examples 6 and 7 in Embrechts et. al. (1999)).
On the other hand, our comparisons for not very heavy-tailed i.i.d. r.v.’s Xi » CSLC given by Corollary 3.2,
imply that the value at risk is, in fact, a coherent measure of risk in the world of such risks.
Furthermore, from Corollary 3.3 it follows that axioms A2 and A5 are always violated for risks with very heavy-
tailed distributions, (even) under their independence. Thus, the value at risk is not a coherent risk measure in the
world of very long-tailed distributions.
Remark 3.1. It is well-known that if r.v.’s X and Y are such that P(X > x) · P(Y > x) for all x 2 R; then
EU(X) · EU(Y ) for all increasing functions U : R ! R for which the expectations exist (see, e.g., Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994, pp. 3-4)). This fact and Theorems 2.1-2.4 imply corresponding results concerning majorization
properties of expectations of (utility or payoﬀ) functions of linear combinations of heavy-tailed r.v.’s. In particular,
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 give sharp bounds on the expected payoﬀs of contingent claims written on a portfolio of heavy-
tailed risks similar to those in Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5. For instance, we get that if U : R+ ! R is an increasing
function, then, assuming existence of the expectations, the function '(a) = EU(j
Pn




n) under the assumptions of Theorem 2.1 and is Schur-concave in (ar
1;:::;ar
n) under the assumptions



















18This interpretation of losses follows that in Embrechts et. al. (1999) and is in contrast to Artzner et. al. (1999) who interpret
negative values of risks in X as losses.














for all portfolios of risks satisfying Theorem 2.2. We also get that the function '(a); a 2 Rn
+ is Schur-concave in
(a2
1;:::;a2
n) if Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;2); or Xi » CS(2): The latter
results complement those in Efron (1969) and Eaton (1970) (see also Marshall and Olkin (1979, pp. 361-365)) who




holds. Further, we obtain that '(a) is Schur-convex in a 2 Rn
+ under the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 and is Schur-
concave in a 2 Rn
+ under the assumptions of Theorem 2.4. It is important to note here that in the case of increasing
convex functions U : R+ ! R and r.v.’s X1;:::;Xn satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2.4, the expectations
EU(j
Pn
i=1 aiXij) are inﬁnite19 for all a 2 Rn
+: Therefore, the last result does not contradict the well-known fact
that (see Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 361)) the function Ef(
Pn
i=1 aiXi) is Schur-convex in (a1;:::;an) 2 R for all
i.i.d. r.v.’s X1;:::;Xn and convex functions f : R ! R as it might seem on the ﬁrst sight.
4. DEMAND-DRIVEN INNOVATION AND SPATIAL COMPETITION
Let ½(x;y) = (x ¡ y)2; x;y 2 R; denote the quadratic loss function. In the setting of Jovanovic and Rob’s
(1987) model of demand-driven innovation and spatial competition described in Subsection 0.6 in the introduction,
let a consumer of type u 2 R have the utility function u ¡ ½(ˆ µ;µ) ¡ pˆ µ; if she purchases one unit of good produced
by the ﬁrm, and 0, if not, where pˆ µ is the price the consumer pays for the good. Consumers are assumed to be
perfectly informed about all price-quality combinations oﬀered by various sellers and the ﬁrm is assumed to be a
price taker. Under the former assumption, a necessary condition for an equilibrium is that ½(ˆ µ;µ) + pˆ µ = p for all
ˆ µ 2 R; where p is the price of the ideal product µ: The size N of the sample S of signals about the next period’s ideal
product observed by the ﬁrm follows a distribution ¼(n;y+z) conditionally on y+z: ¼(n;y+z) = P(N = njy+z);
n = 0;1;2;::: Below, we denote by St; ˆ µt; µt; yt and zt the values of the variables in period t: In the model, the
sequence of events is as follows: in period t; ﬁrst St is observed, next ˆ µt is chosen; then µt is observed and yt and zt
are chosen; the period then ends.
Let L be the set of measures on the set R2 of pairs of decisions (y;z) among ﬁrms; we consider Markovian
equilibria with the aggregate state being the distribution of decisions ºt 2 L such that ºt = ®(µt;ºt¡1) (see Brock
and Mirman (1972), Jovanovic and Rob (1987) and Stokey and Lucas (1989)). In such an equilibrium, the price p
of the ideal product at t can be expressed as a function of ºt¡1 (see Jovanovic and Rob (1987)); this equilibrium
relationship will be denoted p(ºt¡1): The price of the product for a ﬁrm that locates as ˆ µ at t is
pˆ µ = p(ºt¡1) ¡ ½(ˆ µ;µt): (4.1)
For n > 0; denote sn = n¡1 Pn
i=1 si and ²n = n¡1 Pn
i=1 ²i: Further, let F(x;n) = P(j²nj · x); x ¸ 0; n = 1;2;:::;
denote the cdf of j²nj; n = 1;2;:::; on R+: Assuming a diﬀuse prior for µ 2 R; the optimal choice of ˆ µ = ˆ µ(S) in the
case N > 0 is (see Jovanovic and Rob (1987)20) ˆ µ = argmax˜ µN¡1 PN
i=1 ½(˜ µ;si) = argmax˜ µN¡1 PN
i=1(˜ µ¡si)2 = sN:
It is not diﬃcult to see that the loss associated with the choice of the product design ˆ µ(S) for N > 0 is ½(ˆ µ(S);µ) = ² 2
N:
19Since the function (f(x) ¡ f(0))=x is increasing in x > 0 by, e.g., Marshall and Olkin (1979), p. 453.
20In the setting of Jovanovic and Rob (1987), the absolute deviation ½(µ; ˆ µ) = jµ ¡ ˆ µj needs to be replaced by the quadratic loss
½(ˆ µ;µ) = (ˆ µ ¡ µ)2; as in the present section, for the product design to be given by the sample mean of signals: ˆ µ = sN: No conclusion
derived in Jovanovic and Rob (1987) is aﬀected by this small modiﬁcation.
14In the case when N = 0 belongs to the support of N; so that ¼(0;y+z) 6= 0; it is usually assumed that ½(ˆ µ(S);µ) = 1
for N = 0: The cdf of ½(ˆ µ(S);µ) (on R+) conditional on y + z is





x;n)¼(n;y + z); (4.2)
x ¸ 0 (with F(
p
x;0) = 0 if N = 0 belongs to the support of N under the above convention).
The dynamic programming formulation of the ﬁrm’s problem of choosing y and z; following a realization ½(ˆ µ;µ) =




V (˜ x;®(º¡1))d»(˜ x;y+z)
o
(see Jovanovic and Rob (1987)).
Let G(y +z) = ¯
R
V (˜ x;®(º¡1))d»(˜ x;y +z): The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for an interior maximum (y;z)
are
pˆ µ ¡ C0(y) + G0(y + z) = 0; ¡K0(z) + G0(y + z) = 0: (4.3)
The second-order conditions for a maximum are
G00(y + z) < C00(y); C00(y)K00(z) > G00(y + z)(C00(y) + K00(z)) (4.4)
(conditions (4.4) imply G00(y + z) < K00(z)). If
G0(y + z) · K0(z) (4.5)
for all (y;z); then the optimal level of informational gathering eﬀort is zero:
z = 0: (4.6)
In the latter case, the ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for a point (y;0) in the interior of f(y;0)g to be optimal are
pˆ µ ¡ C0(y) + G0(y) = 0; (4.7)
G00(y) < C00(y): (4.8)
We assume that, for any continuous f : R ! R; the expression
R
f(˜ x)d»(˜ x;¸) is diﬀerentiable in ¸: Under
the latter assumption, one can implicitly diﬀerentiate ﬁrst-order conditions (4.3) and (4.7) (see Jovanovic and Rob
(1987)).
Evidently, the condition G00 < 0 suﬃces for conditions (4.4) and (4.8) to hold. However, G00 > 0 is also consistent
with maxima being interior. By Proposition 4 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), if the function G is convex (G00 > 0),
then larger ﬁrms invest more in information. One should note that, according to empirical studies, there is a positive
relationship between R&D expenditures and ﬁrm size, that suggests that G(y+z) is indeed convex (see Kamien and
Schwartz (1982) and the discussion following Proposition 4 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987)).
Suppose that, conditionally on y + z; N has a Poisson distribution with
¼(n;y + z) = ¼0(n;y + z) =
[¹(y + z)]n
n!
exp(¡¹(y + z)); n = 1;2;::: (4.9)
15(with the convention that ½(ˆ µ;µ) = 1 for N = 0) or a shifted Poisson distribution
¼(n;y + z) = ¼1(n;y + z) =
[¹(y + z)]n¡1
(n ¡ 1)!
exp(¡¹(y + z)); n = 1;2;::: (4.10)
(the latter distribution allows one to avoid the ambiguity concerning the value of ½(ˆ µ;µ) in the case N = 0).
Lemma 4.1 obtained by Jovanovic and Rob (1987) gives suﬃcient conditions for concavity of the function G(y+z);
under the assumptions of the lemma, therefore, the second-order conditions for an interior maximum with respect
to y and z are satisﬁed.
Lemma 4.1 (Jovanovic and Rob (1987)). Suppose that, conditionally on y + z; N has a Poisson distribution
¼0(n;y+z) given by (4.9). The function G(y+z) is strictly concave in y+z if the sequence fF(x;n+1)¡F(x;n)g1
n=0
is strictly decreasing in n for all x > 0:
As noted in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), the conditions of Lemma 4.1 are satisﬁed for normal r.v.’s ²i » N(0;¾2);
i = 1;2:::
Jovanovic and Rob (1987) obtained the following Proposition 4.2. In the proposition and its analogues for heavy-









their sizes next period.
Proposition 4.2 (Jovanovic and Rob (1987)). Suppose that, conditionally on y + z; N has a Poisson distribution
¼0(n;y+z) in (4.9). Let the shocks ²1;²2;::: be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that ²i » LC; i = 1;2;::: If the optimal levels (yt;zt)
of output and informational gathering eﬀort satisfy (4.3) and (4.4) or (4.6)-(4.8), then








t ) is always less than 1/2.




t increases (holding constant the size of
one of the ﬁrms).
(c) The distribution of future size is stochastically increasing as a function of current size yt; that is, P(yt+1 >
yjyt) is increasing in yt for all y ¸ 0:
Note that, using the arguments completely similar to the proof of above Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 in
Jovanovic and Rob (1987), one has that the lemma and the proposition also hold under the assumption that N has
a shifted Poisson distribution ¼1(n;y+z) given by (4.10) as well as under the assumption that conditions (4.6)-(4.8)
are satisﬁed.
The following theorem provides a generalization of Proposition 4.2 that shows that the results obtained by
Jovanovic and Rob (1987) hold in the case of not very thick-tailed signals.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that, conditionally on y + z; N has a Poisson distribution ¼0(n;y + z) in (4.9) or a shifted
Poisson distribution ¼1(n;y+z) in (4.10). Let the shocks ²1;²2;::: be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that ²i » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;2;:::;
for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or ²i » CSLC; i = 1;2;::: Then conclusions (a), (b) and (c) in Proposition
4.2 hold.
16Lemma 4.2 below shows that the suﬃcient conditions for an interior maximum in Lemma 4.1 which imply
strict concavity of the function G(y + z) are satisﬁed for shocks ²1;²2;::: with not very fat-tailed symmetric stable
distributions.
Lemma 4.2 If the shocks ²1;²2;::: are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that ²i » S®(¾;0;0); i = 1;2;:::; for some ¾ > 0; and
® 2 (1;2]; then the sequence fF(x;n + 1) ¡ F(x;n)g1
n=0 is decreasing in n for all x > 0:
As the following theorem shows, the conclusions of Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1 are reversed in the case of
shocks ²1;²2;::: with very fat tails.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that, conditionally on y + z; N has a shifted Poisson distribution ¼1(n;y + z) given by
(4.10). Let the shocks ²1;²2;::: be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that ²i » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;2;:::; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and
® 2 (0;1); or ²i » CS(1); i = 1;2;::: If the optimal levels (yt;zt) of output and informational gathering eﬀort satisfy
(4.3) and (4.4) or (4.6)-(4.8), then
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t increases (holding constant the size of one
of the ﬁrms).
(c’) The distribution of future size is stochastically decreasing as a function of current size yt; that is, P(yt+1 >
yjyt) is decreasing in yt for all y ¸ 0:
According to Theorem 4.3 below, condition (4.5) and, thus, relation (4.6) is satisﬁed in the case of very fat-tailed
shocks ²1;²2;::: and the increasing costs K(z) of engaging in the informational gathering eﬀort. That is, if the
function K(z) is increasing in z ¸ 0 and the distribution of the signal shocks is very heavy-tailed, then each ﬁrm
chooses zero informational gathering eﬀort: z = 0:
Theorem 4.3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, G0(y+z) · 0: Therefore, if K0(z) > 0; then (4.5) is satisﬁed
and the optimal choice of informational gathering eﬀort is z = 0:
Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1 imply that, in the case of not very heavy-tailed signals, relatively large ﬁrms
are likely to stay larger; in addition, the size-diﬀerence is positively autocorrelated. According to Theorem 4.2,
these conclusions are reversed in a world of very fat-tailed signals: relatively large ﬁrms are not likely to stay larger
and the size-diﬀerence exhibits negative autocorrelation. The intuition for the results given by Proposition 4.2 and
Theorems 4.1-4.3 is that the larger is a ﬁrm’s size, the greater is the amount of information the ﬁrm gets21. The
samples of consumers’ signals are informative about the ideal product µ if the signals’ distributions are not very
heavy tailed, as in Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1. However, they are uninformative about µ in the case of very
long-tailed distributions in Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. The larger ﬁrms that learn more are thus more likely to come up
with a successful product if the signals are not very fat-tailed (see the discussion in Jovanovic and Rob (1987)). In
21One should also note that, under (4.3) and (4.4), large ﬁrms will not reduce their investment in information to the point where their
informational advantage disappears (Proposition 3 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987)) and, with an additional assumption of convexity of G;
they always invest more according to Proposition 4 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987) (see also Nelson and Winter (1978)).
17a world of very heavy-tailed signals, on the other hand, smaller ﬁrms that get less uninformative signals have an
advantage over their larger counterparts (see Subsection 0.8 in the introduction). The fact that heavy-tailed samples
are uninformative about the next period’s ideal product also drives the conclusion that it is optimal not to invest
into the informational gathering if the cost K(z) of the investment is increasing in z:
5. OPTIMAL BUNDLING DECISIONS FOR COMPLEMENTS
AND SUBSTITUTES UNDER HEAVY-TAILEDNESS
Consider a setting with a single proﬁt-maximizing risk-neutral22 seller providing m goods to n consumers. Let
M = f1;2;:::;mg be the set of goods sold on the market and let J = f1;2;:::;ng denote the set of buyers. Let 2M
be the set of all subsets of M: As in Palfrey (1983), the seller’s bundling decisions B are deﬁned as partitions of
the set of items M into a set of subsets, fB1;:::;Blg = B; where l is the cardinality of B; the subsets Bs 2 2M;
s = 1;:::;l; are referred to as bundles. That is, Bs 6= ; for s = 1;:::;l; Bs \ Bt = for s 6= t; s;t = 1;:::;l; and
[l
s=1Bs = M (see Palfrey (1983) and Fang and Norman (2003)). It is assumed that the seller can oﬀer one (and
only one) partition B for sale on the market (this referred to as pure bundling, see Adams and Yellen (1976))23.
We denote by B = ff1g;f2g;:::;fngg and B = f1;2;:::;ng the bundling decisions corresponding, respectively, to the
cases when the goods are sold separately (that is, on separate auctions or using unbundled sales) and as a single
bundle M: For a bundle B 2 2M; we write card(B) for a number of elements in B and denote by ¼B the seller’s proﬁt
resulting from selling the bundle. For a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg; we write ΠB for the seller’s total proﬁt
resulting from following B; that is, ΠB =
Pl
s=1 ¼Bs: The risk-neutral seller (strictly) prefers a bundling decision B1
to a bundling decision B2 ex ante if EΠB1 ¸ EΠB2 (resp., if EΠB1 > EΠB2). The seller prefers a bundling decision
B1 to a bundling decision B2 ex post if ΠB1 ¸ ΠB2 (a.s.), that is, if P(ΠB1 ¸ ΠB2) = 1:
A representative consumer’s preferences over the bundles B 2 2M; on the other hand, are determined by her
reservation prices (valuations) v(B) for the bundles and, in particular, by their valuations v(fig) for goods i 2 M
(when the goods are sold separately) which are referred to as stand-alone reservation prices. In the case when
the reservation prices for bundles are nonnegative: v(B) ¸ 0; B 2 2M; it is said that the goods in M and their
bundles satisfy the free disposal condition24. The free disposal assumption is particularly important in the case of
information goods and in the economics of the Internet (see Bakes and Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000)). If consumers’
valuations for a bundle of goods is additive in those of component goods: v(B) =
P
i2B v(fig); then the products
provided by the monopolist are said to be independently priced (see Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)). Under free
disposal, the natural analogues of this property for interrelated goods are subadditivity v(B) ·
P
i2B v(fig) in the
case of substitutes and superadditivity
P
i2B v(fig) · v(B) in the case of complements (see Dansby and Conrad
(1984), Lewbel (1985) and Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)).
Throughout this section, Xi; i 2 M; denote i.i.d. r.v.’s representing the distribution of consumers’ tastes for goods
i 2 M that determine their reservation prices for the goods and their bundles. We suppose that a representative
22So that the seller’s utility of wealth function is linear.
23The analysis of mixed bundling, in which consumers can choose among all bundling decisions available (see Adams and Yellen (1976)
and McAfee et. al. (1989)) is beyond the scope of this paper.
24The case when the support of the valuations v(B) intersects with (¡1;0) corresponds to the situation when the goods have negative
value to some consumers (e.g., articles exposing certain political views, advertisements or pornography in the case of information goods,
see Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)).
18consumer’s reservation price v(B) for a bundle B of goods produced by the monopolist is a function of her tastes
for the component goods in the bundle. More precisely, we model the setting with interrelated goods by assuming









where, for r 2 (0;2]; gr(x) = xrI(x ¸ 0); hr(x) = xjxjr¡1; x 2 R; and I(¢) denotes the indicator
function. The valuations for goods i 2 M in the case when they are sold separately are thus v(gr;fig) = gr(Xi)
or v(hr;fig) = hr(Xi); i 2 M: Clearly, in the case r = 1; one has v(h1;fig) = h1(Xi) = Xi; i 2 M: Also, the
reservation prices v(gr;B) satisfy the free-disposal condition: v(gr;B) ¸ 0 for all B 2 2M: It is easy to see that,
for all B 2 2M; v(gr;B) ·
P
i2B v(gr;fig); if r · 1; and
P
i2B v(gr;fig) · v(gr;B); if r ¸ 1; and Xi ¸ 0; i 2 B:
That is, consumers’ reservation price v(gr;B) for a bundle is subadditive in those for the component products if
r · 1; as it is typically required for substitutes, and is superadditive in the rectangle of non-negative tastes if
r ¸ 1; as it is usually assumed in the case of complements. Similarly, for r · 1; the reservation prices v(hr;B) are
subadditive in those for component products in the rectangle of non-negative stand-alone valuation v(hr;fig) i 2 M;
and are superadditive in the components’ valuations in the case when all the stand-alone valuations are non-positive.
For r ¸ 1; the valuations for bundles v(hr;B) are superadditive in those for the components if all the stand-alone
reservation prices are non-negative and are subadditive if the valuations for all component products are non-positive.
More precisely, if v(hr;fig) ¸ 0; i 2 B; then
P
i2B v(hr;fig) · v(hr;B) for r ¸ 1; and v(hr;B) ·
P
i2B v(hr;fig)
for r · 1: If v(hr;fig) · 0; i 2 B; then v(hr;B) ·
P
i2B v(hr;fig) for r ¸ 1; and
P
i2B v(hr;fig) · v(hr;B)
for r · 1: The above super- and subadditivity properties of v(hr;B) for r ¸ 1 are consistent with the assumption
typically imposed on the value function of (complementary) gains and losses in mental accounting and prospect
theory (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1985)). The case r = 1 with reservation prices for
bundles v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi models the case of independently priced goods.
For j 2 J; the jth consumer’s tastes for goods in M are assumed to be ˜ Xij; i 2 M; where ˜ X(j) = ( ˜ X1j;:::; ˜ Xnj);
j 2 M; are independent copies of the vector (X1;:::;Xn); and her reservation prices vj(B) for bundles B 2 2M of








: The seller is assumed to know
only the distribution of consumers’ reservation prices for goods in M and their bundles. The valuations vj(gr;B)
(vj(hr;B)) for bundles B 2 2M; are known to buyer j; however, the buyer has only the same incomplete information
about the other consumers’ reservation prices as does the seller (see Palfrey (1983)).
Let us consider ﬁrst the case in which the goods in M and their bundles are provided by a risk-neutral seller
through Vickrey auctions (see Palfrey (1983)). In this setting, the buyers submit simultaneous sealed bids for bundles
of goods sold by the seller. The bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the seller the second highest
bid. It is well-known that, in such a setup, a dominant strategy for each bidder is to bid her true reservation prices.
In accordance with the assumption of nonnegativity of bids and valuations usually imposed in the auction theory,
we suppose that, for j 2 J; the jth consumer’s reservation price for a bundle B 2 2M of goods sold is given by
vj(gr;B) = gr(
P
i2B ˜ Xij) ¸ 0: The seller’s proﬁt from following a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg is, evidently,
Pl
s=1 v(n¡1)(gr;Bs); where, for s = 1;:::;l; v(n¡1)(gr;Bs) denotes the second highest of consumers’ reservation prices
for the bundle Bs (that is, the second highest order statistic of the reservation prices for the bundle). The following
Theorem 5.1 extends the results in Palfrey (1983) and Chakraborty (1999) to the case of interrelated goods (with
an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability) and consumers with long-tailed valuations. According to
19the theorem, if consumers’ tastes are not very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are substitutes
(or are complements with not very high degree of complementarity) then the auctioneer strictly prefers separate
provision of goods to any other bundling decision.
Theorem 5.1 Let r 2 (0;2); and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given by v(gr;B):
Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
and ® 2 (r;2]; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Then, for all n ¸ 2; the seller strictly prefers (ex ante) B (that is, n separate
Vickrey auctions) to any other bundling decision.
Remark 5.1. From the proof of Theorem 5.1 it follows that, under its assumptions, for any bundle B 2 2M
with the number of elements card(B) = k ¸ 2; the seller’s proﬁt ¼B from selling B on a Vickrey auction is strictly
(ﬁrst-order) stochastically dominated by the proﬁt from selling one of goods in B; say good i 2 B; separately k times,
that is, by the r.v. k¼i; where ¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: Namely, for all x > 0; one has P(¼B > x) < P(k¼i > x)
that means that selling one of goods in B k times separately is always likely to generate higher proﬁts to the seller
than selling the bundle B: As in Remark 3.1, we get, therefore, by Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, pp. 3-4), that
EU(¼B) · EU(k¼i) for all increasing functions U : R+ ! R for which the expectations exist. Similar to the proof
of Theorem 5.2 below, this, in turn, implies that Theorem 5.1 holds as well in the case of a risk-loving seller with
any increasing convex utility of wealth function U such that U(0) = 0:
The intuition behind the results given by Theorem 5.1 is that, in the case of not very heavy-tailed tastes, similarly
to the case of log-concave distributions, the valuations per good become increasingly more concentrated about the
mean valuations with the size of bundles. In particular, in the case of not very long-tailed reservation prices, buyers
with high valuations for the bundle are more likely to win the bundled auction and the next highest bidder is likely
to have relatively lower valuations than in the case of separate auctions. Since it is increasingly likely that at least
one of the buyers will have valuations on the upper tail of the distribution as the number of bidders gets larger, it
becomes more likely that the winner of the auction prefers bundled auctions (see Palfrey (1983)).
There are no counterparts of Theorem 5.1 for very heavy tailed distributions of consumers’ valuations (such as
CS(r)) if the seller’s utility of wealth is linear since, as it is not diﬃcult to see, in this case, the seller’s expected
proﬁts from following any bundling decision are inﬁnite. However, in the case of a risk-averse seller with a concave
utility of wealth function, the following reversal of Theorem 5.1 holds.
Suppose that the seller (strictly) prefers a bundling decision B1 to a bundling decision B2 if EU(ΠB1) ¸ EU(ΠB2)
(resp., if EU(ΠB1) > EU(ΠB2)), where U : R+ ! R is an increasing concave function with U(0) = 0 (that represents
the seller’s utility of wealth satisfying the property of diminishing returns). According to the following Theorem
5.2, in the latter case, the auctioneer strictly prefers providing all the items through one Vickrey auction to any
other bundling decision, if consumers’ tastes are very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are
complements (or are substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability).
Theorem 5.2 Let r 2 (0;2]; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given by v(gr;B):
Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]
20and ® 2 (0;r); or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: If the seller’s utility of wealth is concave, then, for all n ¸ 2; the seller strictly
prefers (ex ante) B (that is, a single Vickrey auction) to any other bundling decision.
Using the general majorization properties of long-tailed distributions presented in Section 2, one can also obtain
the following Theorem 5.3 that characterizes buyers’ preferences over the bundled auctions in the case of indepen-
dently priced goods and very heavy-tailed reservation prices.
Let j 2 J and let ˜ x(j) = (˜ x1j;:::; ˜ xnj) 2 Rn
+: If a bundle B consisting of independently priced goods is oﬀered for
sale on a Vickrey auction then the expectation of the surplus Sj(B; ˜ x(j)) to consumer j with the values of stand-alone
reservation prices ˜ X(j) = ˜ x(j) and induced valuations for bundles vj(B) =
P
i2B ˜ xij; B 2 2M; is (see Palfrey (1983))

















i2B ˜ Xit; B 2 2M; t 2 J; t 6= j: If the seller follows a bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg; then
the expectation of the surplus Sj(B; ˜ x(j)) to the jth buyer with the vector of stand-alone valuations ˜ X(j) = ˜ x(j) is
ESj(B; ˜ x(j)) =
Pl
s=1 ESj(Bs; ˜ x(j)): The jth buyer with ˜ X(j) = ˜ x(j) is said to (strictly) prefer a bundling decision
B1 to a bundling decision B2; ex ante, if ESj(B1; ˜ x(j)) ¸ ESj(B2; ˜ x(j)) (resp., if ESj(B1; ˜ x(j)) > ESj(B2; ˜ x(j))). If
all buyers j 2 J (strictly) prefer a bundling decision B1 to a bundling decision B2 ex ante for almost all realizations
of their reservation prices ˜ X(j); it is said that buyers unanimously (strictly) prefer B1 to B2 ex ante. More precisely,
buyers unanimously (strictly) prefer a partition B1 to a partition B2 if, for all j 2 J; P[E(Sj(B1; ˜ X(j))j ˜ X(j)) ¸
E(Sj(B2; ˜ X(j))j ˜ X(j))] = 1 (resp., P[E(Sj(B1; ˜ X(j))j ˜ X(j)) > ESj(B2; ˜ X(j))j ˜ X(j))] = 1), where, as usual, E(¢j ˜ X(j))
stands for the expectation conditional on ˜ X(j): Clearly, in the case of absolutely continuous reservation prices Xi;
i 2 M; consumers unanimously prefer B1 to B2 ex ante if each of them prefers B1 to B2 for all but a ﬁnite number
of realizations of her stand-alone valuations.
According to Theorem 5.3, consumers unanimously prefer (ex ante) separate provision of goods in Vickrey
auctions to any other bundling decision in the case of an arbitrary number of buyers, if their valuations are very
long-tailed, as modelled by positive stable distributions. These results are reversals of those given by Theorem 6 in
Palfrey (1983) from which it follows that if consumers’ valuations are concentrated on a ﬁnite interval, then buyers
never unanimously prefer separate provision auctions if there are more than two buyers on the market (Theorem
5.3 does not contradict Theorem 6 in Palfrey (1983) since the support of heavy-tailed distributions in Theorem 5.3
is the inﬁnite positive semi-axis R+).
Theorem 5.3 Let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(B) =
P
i2B Xi: Suppose that the stand-
alone reservation prices Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;1;0) for some ¾ > 0 and
® 2 (0;1): Then buyers unanimously strictly prefer (ex ante) B (that is, n separate auctions) to any other bundling
decision.
The underlying intuition behind the reversals of the results on optimal bundling decisions in Vickrey auctions in
the case of very long-tailed tastes in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 is that the distributions of the valuations for individual
goods are more peaked than those of the valuations per good in bundles. This implies, in particular, that buyers
who are on the upper tail of the distributions for the goods are more likely to win separate auctions and the next
21highest bidder is likely to have relatively lower valuations than in the case of a bundled auction. In the case of
positive stable valuations, the latter implications hold even in the case of any consumer, whatever the values of her
reservation prices are. Therefore, contrary to the case of very light-tailed valuations (see the discussion preceding
Theorem 5 in Palfrey (1983)), as the number of buyers gets larger, the winner of the auction is likely to prefer
separate provision of the products.
Remark 5.2. As shown by Palfrey (1983), in Vickrey auctions with independently priced goods and an arbitrary
number of bidders, the total surplus (that is, the sum of the seller’s proﬁt and buyers’ surplus) is always maximized
in the case when the goods are provided on separate auctions. Palfrey (1983) also proves that, with two buyers, the
bidders unanimously prefer separate provision of items ex post and thus ex ante and the seller, on the other hand,
prefers a single auction. Since the above results are, essentially, deterministic, all they are robust with respect to risk
attitudes of the seller and the buyer. However, as discussed in Palfrey (1983), the ex post results on the seller’s and
the buyers’ preferences available in the two-buyer setup cannot be extended in any way to the case when there are
more than two buyers. On the other hand, from Theorem 5.2 with r = 1 and Theorem 5.3 it follows that, in the case
of an arbitrary number of buyers with (very heavy-tailed) positive stable reservation prices, the market participants’
ex ante preferences over the bundling decisions are the same as in the case of the ex post analysis for two-buyer
setting in Palfrey (1983). Namely, the seller’s expected utility of wealth is maximized in the case of a single auction
and the buyers unanimously prefer separate provision of goods to any other bundling decision. Thus, the eﬀects of
bundling on the seller’s expected utility of wealth and the buyers’ expected surplus continue to be the opposites of
one another, although (by Palfrey (1983)) the expected total surplus is still maximized under the separate provision.
Let us now turn to the case in which the prices for goods on the market and their bundles are set by the
monopolist. Let ci; i 2 M; be the marginal costs of goods in M: Suppose that the seller can provide bundles B of
goods in M for prices per good p 2 [0;pmax]; where pmax is the (regulatory) maximum price, with the convention
that pmax can be inﬁnite. For a bundle of goods B 2 2M; denote by pB the proﬁt-maximizing price per good for the
bundle, so that the seller’s expected proﬁt from selling B (at the price pB) is ¼B = J(kpB¡
P
i2B ci)P(v(B) ¸ kpB);
where k = card(B): Clearly, in the case when the marginal costs are identical for goods produced by the seller, that
is, ci = c for all i 2 M; the values of pB are the same for all bundles B that consist of the same number card(B) of
goods: pB = pB0; if card(B) = card(B0): With identical marginal costs, we denote by p the proﬁt maximizing price
per good in the case when all the goods in M are sold as a single bundle and by p the proﬁt maximizing price of
each good i 2 M under unbundled sales. That is, in the case when ci = c for all i 2 M; p = pB with B = M; and
p = pB with B = fig; i 2 M:
The following Theorems 5.4 and 5.5 characterize the optimal bundling strategies for a multiproduct monopolist
in the latter setting with an arbitrary degree of complementarity or substitutability for goods in M (the cases of
valuations v(gr;B) and v(hr;B) with an arbitrary r 2 (0;2]). From Theorem 5.4 it follows that if consumers’ tastes
are not very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are substitutes (or are complements with not
very high degree of complementarity), then the patterns in seller’s optimal bundling strategies are the same as in
the case of independently priced goods with log-concavely distributed valuations (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)
and Fang and Norman (2003) and the discussion in Subsection 0.5 in the introduction).
22Theorem 5.4 Let ¹ 2 R; r 2 (0;2); and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M be given
by v(gr;B) or by v(hr;B): Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for
some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (r;2]; or Xi ¡¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: The seller strictly prefers B to any other bundling
decision (that is, the goods are sold as a single bundle), if ci = c; i 2 M; and p < ¹: The seller strictly prefers B to
any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold separately), if ci ¸ ¹; i 2 M; or if ci = c; i 2 M; and p > ¹:
According to Theorem 5.5, the patterns in the solutions to the seller’s optimal bundling problem in Theorem 5.4
are reversed if consumers’ tastes are very heavy-tailed and the goods are independently priced or are complements
(or are substitutes with not very high degree of substitutability).
Theorem 5.5 Let ¹ 2 R; r 2 (0;2]; pmax < 1; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M of goods from M
be given by v(gr;B) or by v(hr;B): Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹);
i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); or Xi ¡ ¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: The seller strictly prefers B to any
other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold separately), if ci = c; i 2 M; and p < ¹: The seller strictly prefers
B to any other bundling decision (that is, the goods are sold as a single bundle), if ci ¸ ¹; i 2 M; or if ci = c; i 2 M;
and p > ¹:
Theorem 5.6 and 5.7 below give analogues of the results in Theorems 5.4 and 5.5 in the case of independently
priced goods (r = 1).
Theorem 5.6 Let ¹ 2 R; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi:
Suppose that the stand-alone reservation prices v(h1;fig) = Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that
Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (1;2]; or vi ¡ ¹ » CSLC; i 2 M: Then the conclusion
of Theorem 5.4 holds.
Theorem 5.7 Let ¹ 2 R; pmax < 1; and let the reservation prices for bundles B 2 2M be given by v(h1;B) =
P
i2B Xi: Suppose that the stand-alone reservation prices v(h1;fig) = Xi; i 2 M; for goods in M are i.i.d. r.v.’s
such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;1); or vi ¡ ¹ » CS(1); i 2 M: Then the
conclusion of Theorem 5.5 holds.
Similar to the analysis in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999), the underlying intuition for Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 is
that, for not very heavy-tailed distributions of reservation prices and the marginal costs of goods on the right of
the mean valuation, bundling decreases proﬁts since it reduces peakedness of the valuation per good and thereby
decreases the fraction of buyers with valuations for bundles greater than their total marginal costs. For the identical
marginal costs of goods less than the mean valuation, bundling is likely to have the opposite eﬀect on the proﬁt.
On the other hand, the results in Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 are driven by the fact that, in the case of very heavy-tailed
reservation prices, peakedness of the valuations per good in bundles decreases with their size. Therefore, bundling
of goods in the case of very long-tailed valuations and marginal costs of goods higher than the mean reservation
price increases the fraction of buyers with reservation prices for bundles greater than their total marginal costs and
23thereby leads to an increase in the monopolist’s proﬁt. This eﬀect is reversed in the case of the identical marginal
costs on the left of the mean valuation.
Remark 5.3. The assumptions of Theorem 5.5 with r ¸ 1 (and those of Theorem 5.7) are satisﬁed, in particular,
for positive stable tastes (stand-alone reservation prices) Xi » S®(¾;1;¹); i 2 M; where ¾ > 0 and ® 2 (0;1); for
which thus the free disposal condition holds, including the L´ evy distributions S1=2(¾;1;¹): Furthermore, from the
proof of Theorems 5.4-5.7 it follows that the ﬁrst parts (second parts) of conclusions in the theorems hold as well in
the case of arbitrary marginal costs ci if the price per good pB in each bundle B 2 2M is less than (greater than) ¹:
One should also note here that the conditions pmax < 1 in Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 are necessary since otherwise the
monopolist would set an inﬁnite price for each bundle of goods under very heavy-tailed distributions of consumers’
tastes considered in the theorems.
Remark 5.4. It is important to note that Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 shed new light on marketing strategies involving
exclusion of goods for which observations of extreme (both positive and negative) valuations are more likely from
the bundle and selling them separately. Such strategies are often observed on the market, in particular, in the
bundling decisions of cable and direct satellite broadcast television ﬁrms that have marginal costs of reproduction
close to zero. The latter ﬁrms typically oﬀer a ”basic” bundle and use such strategies as pay-per-view approach for
unusual special events such as boxing matches (see Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)). The high valuations for the
special events are concentrated among a small fraction of consumers and thus are likely to be very heavy-tailed.
Therefore, the optimal bundling strategies for the special events are likely to be the opposites of those for light-tailed
distributions of valuations and thus, in contrast to the basic bundles, the events are likely to be provided on pay-
per-view basis. Season tickets for entertainment performances oﬀered by sporting and cultural organizations that
have suﬃciently high marginal costs of production might illustrate the dual pattern in bundling. It seems plausible
that most of the demand for season tickets is concentrated around a relative small fraction of consumers that have
high valuations for performances oﬀered by the entertainment organization. The optimal strategy is to oﬀer tickets
to such consumers as a bundle, as predicted by our results for heavy-tailed tastes under the free disposal assumption
or symmetric long-tailed valuations in the case of suﬃciently large marginal costs. This strategy is the opposite
of separate provision of the most of tickets to performances to consumers who are likely not to have very extreme
valuations.
6. PROOFS
Proof of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. Let r;® 2 (0;2]; ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1]; and let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ and b =
(b1;:::;bn) 2 Rn










i=1 ai 6= 0 and
Pn
i=1 bi 6= 0). Let X1;:::;Xn be independent r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n: It is not
diﬃcult to see that if c = (c1;:::;cn) 2 Rn
+;
Pn






1=® » S®(¾;¯;0): Consequently,










According to Proposition 3.C.1.a in Marshall and Olkin (1979), the function Á(c1;:::;cn) =
Pn
i=1 c®
i is strictly Schur-
convex in (c1;:::;cn) 2 Rn
+ if ® > 1 and is strictly Schur-concave in (c1;:::;cn) 2 Rn
























i ; if ®=r < 1: This, together with (6.1), implies that
Ã(a;x) < Ã(b;x) (6.2)
if x > 0; ® > r or x < 0; ® < r; and
Ã(a;x) > Ã(b;x) (6.3)
if x > 0; ® < r or x < 0; ® > r: This completes the proof of the theorems in the case of stable distributions
S®(¾;¯;0):
Suppose now that X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » CS(r); i = 1;:::;n: By deﬁnition of the class CS(r);
there exist independent r.v.’s Yij; i = 1;:::;n; j = 1;:::;k; such that Yij » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (0;r); ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;n;
j = 1;:::;k; and Xi =
Pk
j=1 Yij; i = 1;:::;n: By (6.2) and (6.3), for j = 1;:::;k; the r.v.
Pn
i=1 biYij is strictly more
peaked than
Pn




















The r.v.’s Yij; i = 1;:::;n; j = 1;:::;k; are symmetric and unimodal by Theorem 2.7.6 in Zolotarev (1986, p. 134).
Therefore, from Theorem 1.6 in Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988, p. 13) it follows that the r.v.’s
Pn
i=1 aiYij;
j = 1;:::;k; and
Pn
i=1 biYij; j = 1;:::;k; are symmetric and unimodal as well. From Lemma in Birnbaum (1948) and
its proof it follows that if X1;X2 and Y1;Y2 are independent absolutely continuous symmetric unimodal r.v.’s such
that, for i = 1;2; Xi is more peaked than Yi; and one of the two peakedness comparisons is strict, then X1 + X2




i=1 biYij; j = 1;:::;k; imply, by induction on k (see also Theorem 1 in Birnbaum (1948) and Theorem 2.C.3 in



















= Ã(b;x) for x > 0 and Ã(a;x) = 1 ¡ Ã(a;¡x) < 1 ¡ Ã(b;¡x) = Ã(b;x) for x < 0: Therefore, the conclusion of
Theorem 2.4 for the class CS(r) holds. The part of Theorem 2.1 for the class CS(r) might be proven in a completely
similar way. The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4. Theorem 2.3 for the case of stable i.i.d. r.v.’s Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i = 1;:::;n;
and Theorem 2.4 for both the cases of stable distributions S®(¾;¯;0) and distributions from the class CS(1) are
immediate consequences of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 with r = 1: Let us prove Theorem 2.3 for the case of the class
CSLC: Let vectors a = (a1;:::;an) 2 Rn
+ and b = (b1;:::;bn) 2 Rn
+ be such that a Á b and a is not a permutation of
b: Let X1;:::;Xn be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » CSLC; i = 1;:::;n: By deﬁnition, Xi = °Yi0 +
Pk
j=1 Yij; i = 1;:::;n;
where ° 2 f0;1g; k ¸ 0 and (Y1j;:::;Ynj); j = 0;1;:::;k; are independent vectors with i.i.d. components such that
Yi0 » LC; i = 1;:::;n; and Yij » S®i(¾i;0;0); ®i 2 (1;2]; ¾i > 0; i = 1;:::;n; j = 1;:::;k: From (6.2) and Proposition
0.1 in the introduction it follows that, for j = 0;1;:::;k; the r.v.
Pn
i=1 aiYij is strictly more peaked than
Pn
i=1 biYij:
Furthermore, from Theorem 2.7.6 in Zolotarev (1986, p. 134) and Theorems 1.6 and 1.10 in Dharmadhikari and




i=1 biYij; j = 0;1;:::;k;
are symmetric and unimodal. Similar to the proof of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, by Lemma in Birnbaum (1948) and its
25proof and induction, this implies that
Pn






i=1 aiYij is strictly more peaked than
Pn






i=1 biYij: This completes the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Proof of Corollary 3.1 . The corollary follows from Theorem 2.3 and relations (0.1) since Xn is weakly consistent
for ¹ under its assumptions.















for all a 2 Rn




















for all portfolio weights w and all r 2 (0;2]: From the latter comparisons and Theorem 2.2 it follows that, under the
assumptions of Corollary 3.5, for all ® 2 (0;1=2) and all w such that w 6= w and w is not a permutation of w;
P(Zw > V aR®(Zw)) = ® = P(Zw > V aR®(Zw)) < P
¡








P(Zw > V aR®(Zw)) = ® = P(Zw > V aR®(Zw)) > P
¡








This implies the bounds in Corollary 3.5. Sharpness of the bounds in Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5 follows from the fact
that, as it is not diﬃcult to see, the bounds become equalities in the limit as ® ! r for symmetric stable r.v.’s
Xi » S®(¾;0;0); i = 1;:::;n: Corollaries 3.2-3.4 might be proven in a similar way, with the use of Theorems 2.1, 2.3
and 2.4 instead of Theorem 2.2 (the strict versions of inequalities (0.2) in Corollary 3.2 are consequences of bounds
in Corollary 3.5 with r = 1).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let j 2 f0;1g; and let, conditionally on y + z; N have a distribution ¼j(n;y + z): Then















x;n + 1) = 1 ¡ P(j²n+1j >
p





x > 0; n = 1;2;::: From (6.6) and (6.7) it follows that, under the assumptions of the theorem,
@»(x;¸)=@¸ > 0 (6.8)
for all x > 0; that is, »(x;¸) is increasing in ¸ for all x > 0: As in Jovanovic and Rob (1987) we have
@y=@pˆ µ = (1=C00)[1 + G00K00=(C00K00 ¡ G00(C00 + K00))] > 0; (6.9)
26if (4.3) and (4.4) hold, and
@y=@pˆ µ = 1=(C00 ¡ G00) > 0; (6.10)
if (4.7) and (4.8) hold, that is, y is increasing in pˆ µ: Conclusion (c) of the theorem now follows from (6.8)-(6.10) and
the property that, by (4.1), pˆ µ is decreasing in ½(ˆ µ;µ):
@pˆ µ=@½ < 0: (6.11)
Let ¸(i) = y(i) + z(i); ½(i) = ½(ˆ µ(i);µ) and »(i)(x) = »(x;¸(i)); i = 1;2; and let y(2) > y(1): As in the proof of
Proposition 6 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), the latter implies, by (6.9), that p
(2)
ˆ µ > p
(1)
ˆ µ under (4.3) and (4.4). Since
y+z is increasing in pˆ µ under (4.3) and (4.4) by Proposition 3 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), we get, therefore, that,
under the assumptions of the theorem, ¸(2) > ¸(1) and thus
»(2)(x) > »(1)(x) (6.12)
for all x > 0 by (6.8). As in the proof of Proposition 6 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), we have






(»(2)(x) ¡ »(1)(x))d»(1)(x): (6.13)
Since
R
»(1)(x)d»(1)(x) = 1=2 using integration by parts, from (6.12) and (6.13) we get
P(½(1) > ½(2)jy(1);y(2)) > 1=2: (6.14)
Relations (6.9), (6.11) and (6.14) imply conclusion (a) of the theorem.
As in the proof of Proposition 6 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987), conclusion (b) of the theorem follows from (6.9)-
(6.11) and (6.13) since, by (6.8), holding y(1) constant and increasing y(2) or holding y(2) constant and decreasing
y(1) increases »(2)(x) ¡ »(1)(x) for all x > 0: The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We have that, under the assumptions of the lemma, n¡1=® Pn
i=1 ²i » S®(¾;0;0): Further-
more, by Theorem 2.7.6 in Zolotarev (1986, p. 134), the distribution of the r.v.’s ²i are unimodal. Therefore, the
function P(²1 · x) is concave in x > 0: This, together with strict concavity of the function x1¡1=®; ® > 1; in x > 0;
implies that, for n ¸ 2 and x > 0;
F(x;n) = 2P(²1 · xn1¡1=®) ¡ 1 > 2P
¡





²1 · x(n + 1)1¡1=®¢
+ P
¡
²1 · x(n ¡ 1)1¡1=®¢
¡ 1 = 1=2(F(x;n + 1) + F(x;n ¡ 1)):
For n = 1; using again unimodality of ²1 and ²2; we get that, for all x > 0;
F(x;1) = 2P(²1 · x) ¡ 1 ¸ 2
h
2¡(1¡1=®)P(²1 · 21¡1=®x) + (1 ¡ 2¡(1¡1=®))1=2
i
¡ 1 >
P(²1 · 21¡1=®x) ¡ 1=2 = 1=2F(x;2):
The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 6 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987)
and the proof of Theorem 4.1, with the use of Theorem 2.4 instead of Theorem 2.3 in this paper and Proposition
270.1 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987). Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, one has, by Theorem 2.4 and relations
(0.1), that, similar to relation (6.7),
F(
p
x;n + 1) = 1 ¡ P(j²n+1j >
p





x > 0; n = 1;2;::: Relations (6.6) and (6.15) imply that, under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2,
@»(x;¸)=@¸ < 0 (6.16)
x > 0; that is, »(x;¸) is decreasing in ¸ for all x > 0: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in Jovanovic and Rob
(1987), from (6.16) it follows that G0(¸) · 0: This implies that conditions (4.5) is satisﬁed and the optimal choice of
informational gathering eﬀort is z = 0 if the cost function K(z) is increasing: K0(z) > 0: Thus, Theorem 4.3 holds.
Relations (6.9)-(6.11) and (6.16) imply conclusion (c’) of Theorem 4.2.
Let, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, ¸(i) = y(i) + z(i); ½(i) = ½(ˆ µ(i);µ) and »(i)(x) = »(x;¸(i)); i = 1;2; and let
y(2) > y(1): By (6.9) and Proposition 3 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987) we have p
(2)
ˆ µ > p
(1)
ˆ µ under (4.3) and (4.4) and,
therefore, ¸(2) > ¸(1) under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2. This and (6.16) imply that
»(2)(x) < »(1)(x); (6.17)
for all x > 0: From (6.13) and (6.17) it follows, similar to the proof Proposition 6 in Jovanovic and Rob (1987) and
to the proof of Theorem 4.1 in the present paper, that
P(½(1) > ½(2)jy(1);y(2)) = 1=2 +
Z
(»(2)(x) ¡ »(1)(x))d»(1)(x) < 1=2: (6.18)
Relations (6.9)-(6.11) and (6.18) imply conclusion (a’) of Theorem 4.2.
Conclusion (b’) of Theorem 4.2 follows from (6.9)-(6.11) and (6.13) and the fact that, by (6.16), increase in the
current size-diﬀerence y(2) ¡ y(1) (holding constant y(1) or y(2)) decreases »(2)(x) ¡ »(1)(x) for all x > 0 under the
assumptions of the theorem. The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let r 2 (0;2) and let Xi; i 2 M; be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for some
¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (r;2]; or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Consider any bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k ¸ 2: Denote
Hk(x) = P(
Pk
i=1 Xi · x); x 2 R: Clearly, the cdf of the r.v. v(gr;B) = gr(
P
i2B Xi) is P(v(gr;B) · x) = Hk(x1=r)
for x ¸ 0; P(v(gr;B) · x) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, we have that, for all x > 0; the cdf of the seller’s proﬁt ¼B
resulting from selling B is
P(¼B · x) = P(v(n¡1)(gr;B) · x) = n(Hk(x1=r))n¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)(Hk(x1=r))n (6.19)
(this cdf is zero for x < 0). For i 2 M; let ¼i be the seller’s proﬁt resulting from selling good i separately, that is,
¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: For x > 0; the cdf of the r.v. k¼1 (that represents the seller’s proﬁt resulting from selling
good 1 k times) is
P(k¼1 · x) = P(v(n¡1)(gr;f1g) · x=k) = n(H1(x1=r=k1=r))n¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)(H1(x1=r=k1=r))n: (6.20)
By Theorem 2.1 and comparisons (0.1), Hk(xk1=r) > H1(x); x > 0; and, therefore, Hk(x1=r) > H1(x1=r=k1=r);
x > 0: Since the function nyn¡1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)yn is increasing in y 2 (0;1); this, together with (6.19) and (6.20) implies
28that P(¼B · x) > P(k¼1 · x) for all x > 0; and, therefore (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, pp. 3-4) and
Remark 2), E(¼B) < E(k¼1) =
P
i2B E(¼i): Consequently, we get that for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg












E(¼i) = E(ΠB): (6.21)
The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let r 2 (0;2) and let Xi; i 2 M; be i.i.d. r.v.’s such that Xi » S®(¾;¯;0); i 2 M; for
some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); or Xi » CS(r); i 2 M: Consider any bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k ·
m ¡ 1: With the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, comparisons (0.1) and Theorem 2.2 imply that
Hk(xk1=r) > Hm(xm1=r); x > 0; and, therefore, Hk(x1=r) > Hm(x1=rm1=r=k1=r); x > 0: Similar to the proof of
Theorem 5.1, we get, therefore, that P(¼B · x) > P((k=m)ΠB · x) for all x > 0: By Shaked and Shanthikumar
(1994, pp. 3-4) and the property that U is an increasing concave function with U(0) = 0; we get, therefore, that
EU(¼B) < EU((k=m)ΠB) · (k=m)EU(ΠB): Consequently, for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that














The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let j 2 J: Let the vector ˜ X(j) of the jth buyer’s reservation prices for goods in M take
a value ˜ x(j) = (˜ x1j;:::; ˜ xnj) 2 Rn
+; (˜ x1j;:::; ˜ xnj) 6= (0;0;:::;0): Consider any bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k ¸ 2:
The j¡th buyer’s reservation price for the bundle is vj(B) =
P
i2B ˜ xij: Using the same notations as in the proof of
Theorem 5.1, we get, similar to Palfrey (1983), that the expected surplus to the buyer when B is oﬀered for sale is







On the other hand, the expected surplus to consumer j when good i 2 B is oﬀered for sale separately is ESj(fig; ˜ x(j))
=
R ˜ xij
0 (H1(x))n¡1dx: By Theorem 2.4 and (0.1), Hk(kx) < H1(x) for all x > 0: This, together with (6.22), implies




if vj(B) > 0: Since the function (H1(y))n¡1 is increasing in y 2 R+; from Theorem 3.C.1 in Marshall and Olkin (1979)




0 (H1(x))n¡1dx is Schur-convex in (y1;:::;yk) 2 Rk
+: Therefore, from




i=1 yi=k) for all (y1;:::;yk) 2 Rk
+












ESj(fig; ˜ x(j)): (6.24)
From (6.23) and (6.24) we get
ESj(B; ˜ x(j)) <
X
i2B
ESj(fig; ˜ x(j)) (6.25)
29if vj(B) > 0 (clearly, (6.25) holds as equality if vj(B) = 0). By (6.25), we have that if the seller follows a bundling
decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks; s = 1;:::;l; and kt ¸ 2 for at least one t 2 f1;:::;lg; then
the expected surplus ESj(B; ˜ x(j)) to buyer j satisﬁes ESj(B; ˜ x(j)) =
Pl
s=1 ESj(Bs; ˜ x(j)) <
Pn
i=1 ESj(fig; ˜ x(j)) =
ESj(B; ˜ x(j)): The proof is complete.
Proofs of Theorems 5.4-5.7. Let r 2 (0;2] and let ci; i 2 M; be arbitrary marginals costs of goods in M: Let the









: Further, let ¹ 2 R and pmax < 1: Suppose that the tastes Xi; i 2 M; are i.i.d. r.v.’s such that
Xi » S®(¾;¯;¹); i 2 M; for some ¾ > 0; ¯ 2 [¡1;1] and ® 2 (0;r); or Xi ¡ ¹ » CS(r); i 2 M: We will show
that the seller’s proﬁt maximizing bundling decision is B if the prices per good pB < ¹ for all bundles B 2 2M;
and is B if pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M: For a bundle B 2 2M; the proﬁt maximizing price per good in the bundle






P(v(B) ¸ kp) and the seller’s proﬁt per good resulting from selling






P(v(B) ¸ kpB); where k = card(B) is the
number of goods in B: For i 2 M; let pi be the price of good i in the case when the goods are sold separately (that
is, in the case of the bundling decision B) and let, as in the proof of Theorem 5.1, ¼i be the monopolist’s proﬁt from
selling the good, namely, pi = pBi and ¼i = ¼Bi with Bi = fig: As in the setup of the optimal bundling problem in
Section 5, in the case when ci = c for all i 2 M; we write p = pM for the price per good in the case when all the n
goods are sold as a single bundle B = M (that is, in the case of the bundling decision B) and p for the price of each
good under unbundled sales (that is, p = pB with B = fig; i 2 M).
Suppose that pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M: Then from Theorem 2.4 and relations (0.1) it follows that, for any


























i2B E(¼i): This implies that
for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks; s = 1;:::;l; and kt ¸ 2 for at least one
t 2 f1;:::;lg; comparisons (6.21) hold.
Suppose now that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M: Then using again Theorem 2.4 and relations (0.1) we get that, for
















i=1 Xi ¸ (mpB)1=r): Therefore, for any bundling decision B = fB1;:::;Blg such that card(Bs) = ks;






























Xi ¸ (mpB)1=r) ·
l X
s=1
(ks=m)E(ΠB) = E(ΠB): (6.26)
From (6.21) and (6.26) we get that the proﬁt maximizing bundling decision is B if pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M and is
B if pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M:
Clearly, the condition that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M is satisﬁed if ci ¸ ¹ for all i 2 M: Furthermore, in the
case of identical marginal costs ci = c; i 2 M; the condition that pB > ¹ for all B 2 2M holds if p > ¹: Indeed,
suppose this not the case and that there exists a bundle B 2 2M with card(B) = k > 1 and pB · ¹: Then, as
30above, we get kE(¼1) = Jk(p ¡ c)P(X1 ¸ (p)1=r) < Jk(p ¡ c)P(
Pk
i=1 Xi ¸ (kp)1=r) · E(¼B): On the other hand,
E(¼B) = Jk(pB ¡ c)P(
Pk
i=1 Xi ¸ (kp)1=r) < Jk(pB ¡ c)P(X1 ¸ (pB)1=r) · kE(¼1); which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we get that if ci = c; i 2 M; then p < ¹ implies that pB < ¹ for all B 2 2M: This completes the proof of
Theorem 5.5. Theorem 5.7 follows from Theorem 5.5 with r = 1: Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 could be proven in a similar
way, with the use of Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 instead of Theorem 2.2. The proof is complete.
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